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abstract
We address three critiques of our book Family Values: The Ethics of 
Parent-Child Relationships (Brighouse and Swift 2014), published 
simultaneously with this reply. In response to Stroud (2016), we emphasize 
the specificity of parents’ rights, and the modesty of our claims about 
them, challenging her laissez faire position on parents' right to confer 
advantage on their children, and stressing the merely illustrative role 
that we give to fair equality of opportunity. In response to Gheaus 
(2016), we clarify our “dual-interest” approach and the content of the 
adult interest in parenting, while defending the claim that that interest 
is relevant to the justification of arrangements for the raising of 
children. In response to Ferracioli (2016), we explain our views about 
how many adults may properly parent a child, the significance of 
children’s autonomy, and the value of continuing relationships 
between parents and their adult children.
Keywords: family, children, right to parent, autonomy
INTRODUCTION
It is gratifying to have our views subjected to such careful attention. Much 
of our response will consist of clarification—explaining what we are and, 
perhaps more importantly, are not trying to do. Our argument is wide-
ranging in that we address a series of issues concerning the ethics of parent-
child relationships that are often treated separately, and ambitious in that 
we offer a novel and unified theoretical approach to those topics. But in 
other ways it is modest, more modest than it has seemed to some readers.
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Between them, our three critics offer a varied and contrasting set of 
objections. Stroud (2016) focuses on the egalitarian or distributive dimension 
of our argument, challenging our views about the limited scope of parents’ 
rights to confer advantage on their children. Gheaus (2016) addresses rather 
what we call the liberal challenge to the family: issues concerning the moral 
basis of the right to parent and of parents’ rights over their children. While 
Stroud is enthusiastic about our “expanding the discourse around the family 
by highlighting the interests of (would-be) parents” (2016: 1, original 
emphasis), it is precisely our willingness to give adults’ interests any role in 
justifying childrearing arrangements that troubles Gheaus. Ferracioli (2016), 
for her part, endorses a dual-interest approach like ours but thinks we have 
misidentified the interests!
Stroud raises the most general methodological questions. She generously 
credits us with some ‘game-changing insights and argumentative strategies’ 
(2016: 180) but it soon emerges that in her view we are playing the wrong game! 
So we begin by explaining what game we are and are not playing, and why 
we think it’s the right one. Those explanations underlie our approach to 
parental partiality and parents’ rights to confer advantage on their children, 
which is the substantive aspect that Stroud criticizes. They also provide a 
framework for discussing key issues raised in the other papers. It is precisely 
because there is something morally distinctive, sui generis we might say, 
about claiming rights to control another human being that Gheaus is 
doubtful about our dual-interest account. Our attempt to explain those 
rights depends on our specific conception of the parental role as fusing love 
and intimacy, on the one hand, and authority or control, on the other—a 
fusion that is challenged by both Ferracioli and Gheaus.
1. BEING SPECIFIC
Stroud wonders both why we want a sui generis justification of parents’ 
rights and why we limit them to the minimum necessary. The answer is 
that we regard parents’ rights as distinctive, and distinctively problematic, 
in two ways that she appears not to. On the distributive side, parents’ rights 
and duties to act partially towards their children conflict with ideals such 
as equality of opportunity; children will have better or worse prospects in 
life depending on their parents’ ability and willingness to confer advantage 
on them. This challenge demands an account of why exactly parents should 
be free to do things to, for, or with their children that benefit them relative 
to others, and what they should be free to do. The liberal challenge, on the 
other hand, arises from the fact that parent and child have distinct and 
sometimes conflicting interests, and children are vulnerable and non-consenting 
parties to the relationship. We need an explanation of why exactly adults 
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should have rights over children, which adults should have them, and what 
those rights should be.
For us, then, the family raises specific justificatory questions that require 
specific responses, and explain why, for us, parents’ rights are the minimum 
compatible with the kind of parent-child relationship that will realize 
familial relationship goods for its participants. Like many liberal theorists, 
we see relationships involving some people exercising authority over the 
lives of non-consenting others as prima facie problematic. That exercise 
requires justification, and limitation, because those subject to that authority 
can properly demand an account of why they should be, or should have 
been, subject to those people within that domain of decision. Like many 
egalitarian theorists, we think that relationships creating inequalities of 
opportunity are prima facie problematic. Those inequalities require 
justification, and limitation, because those on the wrong end of them can 
properly demand an account of why they should be worse off than others 
just because they were raised by different parents. 
To be sure, the liberal challenge is more distinctively problematic. 
Controlling other non-consenting human beings requires special justification; 
that’s why parents’ rights to exercise authority over their children pose 
peculiar problems. Indeed, they trouble Gheaus enough for her to argue that 
“the claim to a right to control a child’s life must be grounded exclusively in 
the child’s interest, in which case there is no sui generis right to parent” (2016: 
202). Benefitting others, by contrast, is commonplace. People routinely act 
partially in favor of particular others—friends, lovers, co-religionists, 
compatriots—and these other types of relationship might be invoked to 
justify their doing so. Indeed, one might doubt that relationships of any kind 
are required to justify inequality-creating interactions. Plausibly, there is a 
general prerogative—one that has nothing at all to do with relationships, 
valuable or otherwise—not only to pursue one’s self-interest but also to 
confer benefits on others in ways that depart from equality. Indeed, conferring 
benefits on others might be part of what it is in one’s self-interest to do.
Stroud seems surprisingly unconcerned on both counts. For her (2016: 183), 
“one might doubt whether parents raising children requires a sui 
generis justification in terms of the distinctive values it realizes, as 
opposed to simply falling under a more general and less demanding 
moral schema… [B]eing a parent is something that a great many 
adults very much want to do with their life. If someone very much 
wants to do x with her life, one might think that alone creates a significant 
moral presumption in favor of allowing her to do x—regardless, it would 
seem, of x’s specific content, or of whether her (or anyone’s) doing x 
would realize important objective values”.
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We are not sure quite what counts as a “presumption”, but for us—as for 
Gheaus - the specific content of x in the child-raising case puts the burden 
of justification on those claiming the right to engage in that particular activity. 
It is problematic to claim the right to control the current life, and influence 
the future life, of another human being by appeal to considerations other 
than that other’s own interests.
According to Stroud (2016: 184), “there is no issue facing us as a society, 
to be settled collectively, about how to bring up children: there are only 
individual adults who want to parent children”. As a claim about how parents 
should be allowed to raise their children this is false. Our society is constantly 
making collective decisions on such controversial questions as what kind 
of discipline parents should be permitted to exercise, what forms of medical 
treatment they should be permitted to administer or obstruct, what kind of 
education they should be permitted or required to provide for their children. 
But it also looks mistaken as a claim about whether there should be parent-
child relationships—or, according to our stipulation, “families”—at all. 
The mere fact that individual adults want to parent children is not sufficient 
to establish the moral propriety of their doing so.
Her view on the distributive side is also surprisingly laissez faire. Readers 
may disagree with our view that parents do not have the right to bequeath 
substantial wealth to their children, but surely few will reject it so quickly. 
Disclosing that an inheritance from her husband’s mother made possible 
the purchase of the Vermont farmhouse in which she wrote the first draft 
of her paper, she writes (2016: 185):
“She loved her son, and the rest of us, and we know she would be deeply 
gratified by all the new horizons her bequest has opened up for us.  
Faced with this vivid awareness of what her bequest has made possible 
for her son and my family, I find it simply impossible to accept that my 
mother-in-law ought not to have been able to leave my husband that 
money: that it would violate nobody’s rights to prevent or prohibit 
people from doing any such thing”.
Let us assume that the sum in question was indeed justly her mother-
in-law’s in the first place; that she had the moral, and not merely the legal, 
right to any say over it. Even so, it is strange to think that one could assess 
whether she had the right to bequeath it to her son merely by awareness, 
however vivid, of the value of the bequest to her and its beneficiaries. 
Suppose that the state had taxed the inheritance sufficiently to make 
purchasing the farmhouse impossible. Would awareness of what could 
have been enjoyed in the absence of that tax make such a constraint on the 
bequest similarly “impossible to accept”?
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We and Stroud, then, approach these matters from very different 
perspectives. But we must also emphasize the limits of our ambition. The 
flip side of our offering a sui generis treatment of parent-child relationships 
is that we do not address all the rights that adults may properly claim with 
respect to the children they parent; we confine ourselves to those that 
invoke the fact that the adult is the child’s parent. We want to know when 
“because I am your parent” is a good answer to the question “Why do you 
have the right to do that to, or with, me?” We want to know when “because 
I am her parent” is a good answer to the question “Why do you have the 
right to do that for her?” (see Brighouse and Swift 2014: 120).
Other good answers to such questions might be available. Perhaps parents 
have permissions, deriving from sources other than the familial relationship, 
that permit them to pursue their own projects in ways that will affect what 
they may legitimately do, all things considered, by way of exercising authority 
over their children’s lives (see Brighouse and Swift 2014: 121-2). Perhaps they 
have permissions to confer benefits on anybody they like, including their 
children, which derive from a more general moral schema of the kind that 
Stroud mentions. It would be a different task to engage with those other 
justifications. As far as our theory of parents’ rights is concerned, we are 
interested only in what kinds of partiality, and what exercises of authority, 
can be justified specifically on the ground that the other person involved is 
a child one is parenting.
So Stroud is mistaken in attributing to us (2016: 182) the view that “if 
disallowing parents a certain right or privilege would not impede the 
development of a flourishing parent-child relationship, then that putative 
right or privilege stands exposed and undefended against any arguments 
that could be raised against it” [original emphasis]. The putative right or 
privilege stands, for us, exposed and undefended only against the kind of 
argument that appeals to the fact that the alleged right or privilege holder 
is the child’s parent. Indeed, when assessing what, all things considered, 
they should be free to do with respect to their children, we acknowledge 
the relevance not only of parents’ other roles or statuses but also of more 
indirect factors such as incentive considerations (see Brighouse and Swift 
2014: 130-1).
Our contribution on the distributive side pursues a suggestion from 
Samuel Scheffler, for whom parental partiality raises, in a particular form, 
the general issue of the “distributive objection” to special responsibilities 
that arise in the context of valuable relationships: “The problem with such 
responsibilities is … that they may confer unfair benefit. … [S]pecial 
responsibilities give the participants in rewarding groups and relationships 
increased claims to one another’s assistance, while weakening the claims 
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that other people have on them”. Scheffler (2003: 102) observes that his account 
“is compatible with the view that the strength of one’s responsibilities depends 
on the nature of the relationships that give rise to them, and on the degree 
of value that one has reason to attach to those relationships. As far as the 
content of the responsibilities is concerned, we may assume that this too 
depends on the nature of the relationships in question . . .” [added emphasis]. 
Our aim is to put the parent-child relationship under the microscope while 
allowing that a host of other considerations will be relevant to questions of 
legitimate parental partiality, all things considered, in any particular 
circumstances. It is compatible with recognition both that other relationships 
may generate other distributive claims and that individuals may enjoy 
prerogatives to favor themselves and others in ways that make no reference 
to relationships at all.1
Whether we are playing the right game, or even a game worth playing, 
depends, then, on how important it is to identify, and isolate, this particular 
kind of justification. In our view, parents’ rights to exercise authority over 
their children are typically and substantially defended by appeal to the 
specific thought that the adults in question are indeed the child’s parents. 
We acknowledge that rights to benefit children are, by contrast, more often 
presented in a more general frame: “It’s my money and I can do what I want 
with it. If I want to leave it to my children or spend it on their education, 
that’s up to me”. But even here, distinctively familial considerations are 
often invoked, especially in attempts to justify blocking egalitarian measures. 
(“My job is to promote my child’s interests; you violate my rights as a parent 
if you interfere with my capacity to do that by, for example, limiting bequest, 
or restricting my freedom to spend my resources on her education”.) The 
task of identifying and isolating “family values properly understood”, and 
thereby exposing as unwarranted many such normative appeals to “the 
family”, seems to us a game well worth the candle.
2. CONFERRING ADVANTAGE
That remains true even if, as Stroud (2016: 191-192) claims, “the prohibition 
not just of bequests, but of all the various ways in which parents might seek 
to use their superior financial resources to benefit their children (think 
private schooling), would have only an insignificant effect on the unequal 
distribution of prospects for desirable jobs, etc. across children. That is, 
parents’ direct use of money to benefit their children is—it turns out—a 
relatively minor contributor to inequality of opportunity (Brighouse and 
1 A “relationship goods” approach may be relevant to those also. For an initial schematic 
move in one particular direction, see Brighouse and Swift (2011).
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Swift allude to this at 31-32 and 125-127.)” She thinks (2016: 192) that this 
admission makes “overly optimistic” our claim that our “account of ‘family 
values properly understood’ … mitigates—massively mitigates—the conflict 
with equality” [original emphasis]. But any appearance of tension between 
these two claims is illusory; dispelling that illusion may help to clarify our 
aim further. 
The first is an empirical point about existing societies. Given current 
reward schedules, and the mechanisms by which people reach their places 
in the distribution, the direct use of parents’ money to benefit children 
may indeed be less significant contributors to inequalities of opportunity, 
between children raised in different families, than parent-child interactions 
of the kind endorsed and protected by our theory. The second is an observation 
about the kind of society that would be compatible with our account: it is 
perfectly possible to respect, and promote, what is important and valuable 
about the family without allowing parent-child relationships to produce 
anything like the inequalities of opportunity that they currently do. One 
way of doing this would be by reducing the extent to which children who 
participate in those relationships also benefit, in other ways, from doing 
so—that extent depends on how other social institutions are designed (see 
Brighouse and Swift 2014: 33). At present, “family values” are often invoked 
to defend not only the interactions within the relationships but also the 
conferral of external benefits that they currently involve. By rejecting the 
claim that parents (qua parents) have the right to confer advantage on 
their children in ways that conflict with fair equality of opportunity, we 
challenge that defense.
The game is still worth the candle, we believe, even when we add a further 
caveat: although we invoke “familial relationship goods” to identify the 
interests that ground parents’ rights, we are explicit that the rights we are 
talking about are prima facie only. Indeed, strictly speaking, the category 
of “familial relationship goods” is intended only to isolate those parent-child 
interactions that are “susceptible to justification by appeal to the parent-child 
relationship” (see Brighouse and Swift 2014: 146). Some of those goods, and 
hence some of the interactions that produce them, are worthy of protection 
even when they conflict with fair equality of opportunity. Others – such as 
the loving general promotion of one’s child’s interests – are not, we claim, 
weighty enough to warrant the cost in terms of that distributive value.
Just as one might have rights to benefit one’s children that do not derive 
specifically from the fact that one is their parent, so too one might not have, 
all things considered, the right to do things for them that one has, prima 
facie, in virtue of being their parent. Perhaps, in a world where some lack 
what they need for mere survival, much of the time and energy spent by 
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affluent parents on the provision even of core familial relationship goods, 
for themselves and their children, exceeds the scope of any plausible right—
especially where parents have more than one child. Having identified a 
criterion for evaluating parent-child interactions as important contributors 
to valuable familial relationships, and so prima facie protected by parents’ 
rights, we offer a judgment about the considerations at stake in the conflict 
between the advantage-conferring aspects of familial relationship goods, 
on the one hand, and fair equality of opportunity, on the other. But we 
explicitly refrain from offering judgments about the rights that parents 
have, all things considered, in circumstances (which we take to be our 
own) where the distributive ideal with which those rights might conflict is 
more urgent than fair equality of opportunity (see Brighouse and Swift 2014: 
143-5) We similarly refrain from considering what kinds of conferrals of 
advantage on children might fall under the parental duty of care – the 
discharge of which is justified even where it conflicts with fair equality of 
opportunity – in circumstances where societal arrangements mean that those 
children face the risk, as adults, of falling into poverty or lacking medical 
treatment.2 A lot more is needed to get from (i) a criterion for identifying which 
parent-child interactions are and are not important enough to be worth 
protecting even where they conflict with fair equality of opportunity to (ii) 
all things considered evaluations of particular prescriptions—whether 
political policies or individual actions—in our current circumstances. 
Indeed, a lot more is needed even, more modestly, to identify the precise 
content of parents’ rights in those circumstances.
Stroud doubts that fair equality of opportunity can bear the weight we 
put on it. We invoke that distributive principle as a criterion for distinguishing 
between different types of familial relationship goods. The “core” goods, as 
we term them, are important enough to be worthy of protection even when 
that undermines fair equality of opportunity. (Though, as just noted, parents 
would have no complaint were institutions to be designed in such a way that 
that conflict was reduced or even eliminated.) But the good of generally having 
one’s interests promoted by a loving parent is not, we say, important enough to 
be worthy of similar protection; it should yield to children’s interest in 
competing on fair terms with others. We agree with her that fair equality of 
opportunity is not a hugely weighty principle—we emphasize its limitations, 
and the importance of other distributive values, several times (see Brighouse 
and Swift, 2014: 33-5, 38-45, 143-8). Maybe we are wrong to claim that, were 
it the only distributive consideration at stake, it could serve as a constraint 
on interactions in which the parent is lovingly motivated generally to further 
2 For remarks on this issue in the specific case of school choice, see Swift (2003: 119-
125). Brighouse and Swift (2014) attempts no analogous discussion of the more general issue.
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the child’s interests. If so, that would be an objection to our proposed particular 
weighting of the conflicting values, not to our methodological approach.
But we should also point out that our account of the core familial relationship 
goods leaves plenty of room for parental spontaneity and discretion in the way 
that they relate to their children (see Brighouse and Swift 2014: 140-3). That, 
combined with the recognition that loving parents will be spontaneously 
motivated to benefit their children quite generally, seems to us to leave 
sufficient room for the concern in question. In so far as the things that 
parents do to benefit their children are done as an inevitable part of a 
healthy loving relationship, they are protected by our theory. Again, 
though, our view is that the familial relationship itself cannot plausibly be 
invoked to defend any resulting conferral of advantage that gives children 
better chances than they would enjoy under fair equality of opportunity. 
The fact that one is spontaneously motivated to benefit one’s children, and 
healthy relationships require space for spontaneity, explains why one 
should be free to act on those motivations, but provides no objection to 
societal attempts to limit, or even eliminate, the impact of those actions on 
children’s prospects of the kind with which fair equality of opportunity is 
concerned.
3. CLAIMING AUTHORITY
According to Gheaus (2016: 196), “a right to parent is an anomaly by liberal 
lights: liberals acknowledge no other entitlement to exercise power over 
another individual legitimized in part by reference to an interest—no matter 
how important—of the one exercising power”. Our dual-interest theory—
and our positing different grounds for the right to parent and the rights of 
parents—is an attempt to strike the right balance between the interests of 
the different participants in the relationship. But we need to be clear about 
what exactly it means to have a dual interest theory, and where exactly adults’ 
interests come into the picture.
To clarify our approach, and our attempt to strike the right balance 
between the interests at stake, notice that there are at least three somewhat 
different issues under discussion:
I. How children should be raised. Here our argument for the family 
 – for parent-child relationships – defends that practice against 
 alternatives such as their being reared by professionals in state- 
 run childrearing institutions.
II. The content of parents’ rights: what rights parents can properly 
 claim with respect to their children in virtue of being those children’s 
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 parents. One can know that children should be raised by parents 
 without having a full specification of parents’ rights.3 Here we 
 challenge conventional views that grant parents extensive rights to 
 confer advantage on their children and to shape their children’s values.
III. How to match up children and adults in families. One can know 
 that children should be raised by parents and what rights their 
 parents should have without knowing who should parent, or by 
 parented by, whom. Here, inter alia, we reject both the view that 
 genetic connection establishes an adult’s claim to parent a child 
 and the claim that children have a right to be parented by the 
 best available parent.
In our view, different considerations are relevant to addressing these 
different issues. With regard to (ii), the content of parents’ rights, our account 
is exclusively child-centered. The rights in question are those needed properly 
to discharge the role of parent, which role is itself entirely fiduciary. But it’s 
a separate question, of type (iii), who has the right to be a parent, and our 
answer to that question invokes the adult interest in fulfilling the role (see 
Brighouse and Swift 2014: 121). Understanding this position depends on 
keeping in mind the specific point with which we started: that parents’ 
rights are specifically the rights one has qua parent. The right to parent, by 
contrast, is one that one has, if one has it, simply as an adult.
Clarifying the structure of our view does not show it is valid, or even 
coherent, but before moving on to that challenge, we can illustrate it further 
by attempting to address one of Gheaus’ concerns. She is troubled, inter alia, 
by the right of parents to exclude others from having close relationships with 
their children, and attributes to us the view that parental authority includes 
a right to exclude those others “for reasons other than the protection of the 
child’s interest” (2016: 202). But, for us, the duty on the part of others not to 
undermine the relationship between parent and child, like the right of 
parents to exclude others where it is likely to do so, derives entirely from 
children’s interests in the relationship (see Brighouse and Swift 2014: 87). It 
is precisely because—and only in so far as—it would be bad for children to 
have their familial relationships disrupted that parents have a right to 
exclude others from forming relationships with their children. That right, 
like all parents’ rights, is limited by, and justified in terms of, that fiduciary 
consideration. This is consistent with children having interests in relationships 
with other adults and indeed with facilitating such relationships being part 
3 Of course this is not an entirely separate enterprise. To justify the family just is to 
justify a child-raising arrangement in which particular adults have certain rights over the 
children they parent (see Brighouse and Swift, 2014: 86-7). Still, the detailed and careful 
specification of the rights that one has, qua parent, is sensibly conceived as a further task, to 
be carried out after one has done enough to answer the first two questions.
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of parents’ fiduciary role.
Gheaus may object that the right to exclude is not properly characterized 
as a right one that one has qua parent. Rather, she might suggest, it should 
be seen as an aspect of the right to parent. After all the right to parent 
includes the right to exclude others. Something of this kind, indeed, is true 
of all parents’ rights: the relationship involves various rights (and duties), 
so in claiming the right to parent one is claiming the rights of a parent. If, 
as we think, adults’ interests are relevant to deciding who has the former, 
then they are obviously relevant to deciding who gets the latter. So adult 
interests do indeed come into the story that explains why they have the 
right to exclude others from relationships with particular children; they 
come in as considerations taken into account by the procedure that grants 
to adults the (entirely fiduciary) rights that they have with respect to the 
children they parent. Gheaus may yet be right to reject our view: we have not 
yet defended the claim that adults’ interests are indeed relevant considerations. 
But we doubt that those adults who, as a result of the allocation, are excluded 
from relationships with those particular children, have a valid complaint. 
Their exclusion is the outcome of the right way of deciding who should get 
to exclude. 
Let’s think about Gheaus’ refugees. In her scenario, the refugees seem 
only to be refugees. There is a question about how they should be socialized 
into the host community but no suggestion that, having been socialized, 
they might in turn be involved in the socialization of future waves of refugees. 
Suppose, instead, that migration is expected to continue, and that most of 
the current refugees, having been socialized, will come to have a strong 
interest in playing a socializing role for those future refugees. Suppose we 
agree with Gheaus (2016: 201) that “it is exclusively the refugees’ interests 
that determine the ideal way of socializing them”. Which way of socializing 
refugees does in fact serve these refugees’ interests best? 
The answer will surely take into account not only their interests qua 
refugees, but also the future or prospective interest they are likely to develop, 
qua prospective socializers. Imagine asking a refugee how she would like to 
be socialized: “Would you rather be socialized in whatever way was best for 
you, or in a way that meant that your opportunity to take your turn in 
socializing future refugees did not depend entirely on whether you were 
the best available socializer?” Wouldn’t she reply: “I’m not sure I understand 
the question. The way of socializing me that’s best for me is the one that is 
best for me over my life as a whole. If it’s very valuable for me to have the 
opportunity to socialize future refugees, then the system of socializing that 
would be best for me, over my life as a whole, is unlikely to be one that makes 
that opportunity depend entirely on my being the best available socializer 
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of any one of them”.
This is one sense in which a theory of childrearing arrangements could 
be “dual interest”: it takes into account people’s interests both as children 
and as the adults those children will become. If, as we claim, and Gheaus 
does not deny, many adults do indeed have a weighty interest in parenting 
a child, then so do the children who are going to become those adults. They 
are the same people. On this interpretation, a child-centered view might be 
one that regarded as relevant only people’s interests as children, i.e. during 
the period of life in which they are children. 
Such a position is deeply implausible. Children’s interests in that sense 
are indeed important, and we agree that there has been a tendency to 
overemphasize the view of children as “adults in the making”, to see them 
too much as “becomings” and not enough as “beings”, and to underplay 
the value of what we might think of as the intrinsic or special goods of 
childhood. But, in standard cases, nobody would seriously suggest that we 
could assess childrearing practices by ignoring their formative impact on 
the adults that children become. Indeed, this understanding of what it would 
mean for a theory to be child-centered would run contrary to standard usage 
in the literature. When philosophers talk about children’s interests in how 
they are raised, they include their developmental interests, their interest in 
developing capacities that will benefit them when they reach adulthood. 
Those, like us, who frame their views in terms of a contrast between the 
childrearing interests of children and adults actually intend something 
different: by “children’s interests” we mean simply all those interests in 
how they are raised, including those that will affect their lives as adults, 
except the interest they will have, as adults, in how children are raised. We 
are interested in people’s lifetime interest in childrearing arrangements, 
but we separate out that particular adult interest for analytical purposes, 
and to show how giving it its proper weight qualifies the extent to which 
their other interests should determine those arrangements. A child-centred 
account, on this interpretation, would treat that adult interest as irrelevant to 
the question of how children should be raised. That too strikes us as implausible.
To be clear, on this construal, a dual interest view does not guarantee 
that any particular child will be raised by the particular adult(s) who would 
in fact have been best for her over her lifetime. Nor do children collectively 
have a claim to that particular allocation of adults to children that will be 
best, overall, for children over their lifetimes. The point is not that, once we 
have the right account of children’s lifetime interests, they do have a claim 
to the best available parents after all. Rather, they should be parented according 
to childrearing arrangements—understood as a way of arranging the raising of 
children and, more specifically, a way of arranging who is parented by whom—that 
 Advantage, Authority, Autonomy and Continuity 232
LEAP 3 (2015)
is best for them over their lifetime.
The rationale for a dual interest view is that the price, for children themselves, 
of being parented according to childrearing arrangements in which children 
are parented by their best available parents will be too high. Discussing how 
much we owe children, Matthew Clayton (2015: 251) points out that: “What 
is best for us as children … may not be best for us taking our lives as a whole 
when we factor in the costs of fulfilling the duty to provide the best childhood 
for any offspring we might have”. Similarly, the way of arranging the raising 
of children that is best for us “as children” may not be best for us taking our 
lives as a whole, when we factor in the costs of fulfilling the duty to provide 
children with the best way of raising them “as children”.
An entirely child-centered way of arranging the raising of children, in 
either of the senses we have identified, will be costly in two different ways. 
First, it could leave adults who have a weighty interest in parenting unable 
to do so simply because there would not be any children for whom their 
parenting would be best. Second, less obviously, and empirically less 
plausibly, it could require adults who have no interest in parenting—indeed 
whose lives would go much worse—to serve in that role, simply because, as 
it happened, enlisting their services would be optimal for children. 
Thinking about people’s interests over the life course, this surely gets the 
intra-individual balance of interests wrong.
What about a child who will never reach adulthood, so has no interest in 
being able to parent? It might seem that her interests are decisive against 
the claims of any would-be parents. But what drives our intuition in that 
case may be not the fact that she is a child but rather that her life’s shortness, 
and her failure to develop into adulthood, mean that she will be so badly 
off, on a lifetime view, that her interests during the short time that she has 
should be regarded as decisive. Think instead about children whose lives 
will otherwise go normally, but who, as it happens, have no interest in 
themselves becoming parents. It is true that we cannot say to them that 
their lifetime interests are better protected by a way of arranging childrearing 
that gives some weight to the adult interest in parenting. But it is not clear 
to us why the interests of adults who do have that interest should be ignored 
altogether. Imagine a parent saying to her child: “I know that someone else 
would have done a better job of parenting you. I know, further, that you will 
not personally benefit from the way in which our society’s childrearing 
arrangements protect people’s interests in becoming parents. But I hope 
you agree that it was so wonderful for me to get to be your parent that you 
don’t have any complaint against me for parenting you, despite not being 
the person who would have parented you best, or, more relevantly, not 
being the parent you would have had under a system that regarded children’s 
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interests as the only ones that matter. After all, I was good enough”. Of course 
there is a question about quite how much worse than the relevant alternative a 
parent could be before the child did indeed have a complaint; that is the 
question of whether “good enough” should be construed in absolute or 
comparative terms (see Shields 2016). But to resist Gheaus’ objection we 
need only defend the view that adults’ interests should play some role in 
deciding childrearing arrangements.
Two considerations, both raised by Gheaus’ example, might seem to lend 
support to the view that only children’s interests should count. One is the 
suggestion, more than hinted at by the analogy with refugees, that children 
are in a parlous state and in need of rescue. This would correspond to the 
thought that childhood is a “predicament”, an unfortunate state, certainly 
inferior to adulthood (Schapiro 1999). Suppose childhood is a predicament 
from which people need to be rescued. Would it follow that they should be 
rescued in the way that was best for them, without any regard to the interests of 
the rescuers? When we think of refugees, of course, we typically imagine 
them to be not only in desperate need through no fault of their own but 
also victims of injustice. But unless we regard children as wronged simply 
by being brought into existence, we doubt the analogy holds. Indeed, 
in standard rescue cases it’s not obvious that potential rescuers have to rescue 
in the best possible way, and with no regard to the costs, to them, of different 
ways of rescuing. In the case of children, we need to keep in mind that, for 
all we know, children may go on to have much better lives, overall, than those 
who parent them—even if their interests are not the only ones that determine 
how they are raised. With that clearly in mind, why should we only think 
about them when deciding how they should be raised?
Perhaps, however, the problem is specifically that the child is subject to 
the authority of the parent. She needs others to exercise control over her and, 
as we have said, there is something distinctively problematic about one 
person claiming a right to authority over another on grounds other than 
that other’s interests. This is what Gheaus (2016: 200) calls ‘the republican 
response’: “if it were possible to promote the refugee’s current well-being 
and future autonomy without locking her into any particular relationship, 
then giving you—or another private individual—authority over her would 
be wrong because it would make her subject to (perhaps benevolent) 
domination”. This frames the point in relation to issue (i): should children 
be raised by parents (in families) at all? But it applies also to issue (iii). 
Grant, for the sake of argument, that it is best for children to be raised in 
families. One might still think it objectionable, on republican grounds, to 
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subject particular children to the authority of particular adults except on 
the grounds that the matching-up of children to adults is optimal for the 
children.4
It is misleading to give too much emphasis to the idea that parents have 
an interest in exercising authority as such. Gheaus is more careful, but 
Ferracioli (2016: 217) claims that we vindicate “the current model of parental 
authority” by arguing that parents have an interest in “exercising authority 
over children”. Our exposition of the adult interest emphasizes the 
normative significance of the particular combination of features of the 
parenting relationship (see Brighouse and Swift 2014: 88-93). It’s valuable 
to play the fiduciary role, and to have responsibility for decisions affecting 
the child’s upbringing, in the context of a relationship with other distinctive 
features, which might be summarized as loving intimacy. Controlling, or 
exercising authority, plays a key role in our analysis because this is the 
distinctively troubling aspect of the relationship, and the one that has led 
some theorists to develop entirely child-centered accounts. But that does 
not mean that it is the interest in controlling, or exercising authority, that 
does the work on the adult side. Someone who wanted to parent in order to 
control or exercise authority over a child would be badly missing the point.
Both Gheaus and Ferracioli press us on the way in which our account of 
the parent-child relationship fuses intimacy and authority. We emphasize 
the value to the child of experiencing her parent as both loving and 
authoritative, as well as the adult interest in having some responsibility for 
and discretion over how she conducts her relationship with her child. 
(Imagine the reading of prescribed bedtime stories as the dutiful execution 
4 At the end of her paper, Gheaus considers how the way that children come into the 
world might relate to the question of how they should be raised and, if parented, who should 
parent them.  It is, as she says, surely an important disanalogy between children and her 
refugees that children already have connections of various kinds to particular adults. Although 
she talks about biology, an analytically distinct—though empirically often associated—
connection should perhaps be particularly salient to those worried by the idea of adults 
appealing to their own interests to justify claims to parent children. What’s objectionable, 
for Gheaus, is an adult claiming a parenting relationship with a child on the ground that the 
relationship will benefit the adult. In general terms, we might say, the adult is using the—
non-consenting—child as a means to the adult’s ends. If Gheaus thinks that would be 
troublesome in a world where babies were brought by storks, she should surely be much 
more concerned about a world, like our own, where babies are typically produced in order to 
serve the interests of those producing them. It seems less problematic to allow hosts’ socializing 
interests to influence how refugees are socialized than it is to allow adults’ interests to influence 
how children are raised when those adults have deliberately created the children and have 
done so in order to claim a parental relationship with them. That really does look like using 
children as a means to one’s own ends. Rather than a gestatory relationship helping to 
establish a right to raise a particular child, as she has elsewhere suggested (Gheaus 2012), 
perhaps an adult’s interests should count less where she has deliberately created the being 
that now stands in need of rescue-by-authority from his predicament.
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of state directives.) But interesting questions arise about the extent to 
which, and ways in which, these two features need to go together, and how 
they might come apart while preserving the essential core of the relationship. 
In thinking about this, it might be useful to distinguish micro-authority, 
understood as the day-to-day regulation, disciplining, and control of the 
child, from macro-authority, understood as the making of big picture 
decisions, such as where the child goes to school, whether she eats meat, 
whether she attends religious services, and so on. We already insist that the 
weighty familial relationship goods at the heart of our account could be 
produced in parenting regimes that gave parents much less discretionary 
authority than they currently enjoy on macro-issues, so we think of ourselves 
as attempting to limit the authoritative dimension to the minimum necessary. 
Those goods are surely hard to produce when parents are having to deny or 
conceal too much of themselves, or to raise their children in ways that they 
regard as deeply misguided. But we are in principle sympathetic to Gheaus’ 
suggestion (2016: 202) that (macro) authority and intimacy might be disentangled 
in so far as that can be done without undue cost to relationship goods. 
Like Gheaus, Ferracioli objects to our claim that both adults and children 
have an interest in the adult simultaneously loving, caring for, and having 
considerable authority over, the child. The family as we understand it is 
coercive, the parent exercising power over the child, and we claim that 
children need at least one person who both loves them and exercises 
discipline over them. Children need one person to love them because being 
loved is a precondition for their healthy emotional, moral, cognitive, and 
even physical development. They—especially when they are very young—
need someone who disciplines them because they are inexperienced in the 
world (they do not, for example, know what is dangerous) and lack the kind 
of self-control necessary fluently to exercise agency. And they need these 
roles to be played by a single person because that person will then more 
successfully guide them understand and regulate their emotional reactions 
to the world and develop the tendency to react appropriately to it. Someone 
who disciplines them without loving them or being loved by them may, 
perhaps, be able to get them to comply with commands through fear, or 
charisma, but the important developmental aim of disciplining a child is 
not to secure their compliance in the moment, but to get them, over time, 
to internalize disciplinary regulation. This is one reason why children can 
only have a limited number of parents—we don’t know the number, but in 
the book we suggest that four might be the limit.
Ferracioli sees this as a drawback, and poses an alternative that would 
allow for “more dispersed authority among parties who care robustly for a 
child, and so, in principle, allows for more than four parents”. For her (2016: 
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218), “this is already taking place with modern family arrangements where 
children are loved deeply by their parents, stepparents and godparents … 
it seems odd to artificially limit the size of the family just so that each adult 
can exercise more authority over her life”.
Our suggestion that a child cannot have more than four parents is a 
conjecture, not a stipulation. We just don’t know how many parents (in the 
sense of lovers who also discipline) a child can have. But too many—and 
we suspect that five would be too many—carries risks. First the child may 
not receive sufficiently harmonized information about how to interpret and 
interact with the world. Adults have different parenting styles, conveying 
different messages; though all five may discipline the child well, for example, 
her development may be impaired by too many mixed signals. Second, she 
may not be well enough cared for, because the coordination costs escalate 
as the number of caregivers increases. Consider a typical day with a toddler. 
You look after the toddler for 6 hours, and then a second parent takes over 
while you go to work for a while. To look after the toddler well the second 
parent needs a good deal of information—what mood is she in today? How 
might it affect her behavior? When did she last eat and did she eat well? Is a 
tooth bothering her? Did she nap well, or not at all? Has anything happened 
that might produce a delayed reaction? It is easier to convey this information 
well if the other parent has spent a good deal of time with her recently; 
partly because he then has a good deal of the necessary background 
information about the child, but also because his skills of caring for her are 
still in good shape. The more transitions the child makes among adults, 
the leakier the information bucket, and the rustier the carers’ skills. Finally, 
as the number of parents with authority increases, the potential for disputes 
about what the interests of the child are and how to meet them escalates, as do 
the costs of resolving them, while the prospect of resolution diminishes. Already, 
with just two parents, this can be difficult. The reason to limit the number of 
parents, then, is not so that any individual can exercise more authority over a 
child’s life, but so that children’s interests can be better realized
All that said, our claim that parents rightfully have authority over their 
children does not imply a vision of a cramped, socially isolated, nuclear 
family. It is in children’s interests that parents exercise considerable authority 
over them, and others must be careful not to undermine the parent-child 
relationship. But over the course of their childhoods children have a 
profound interest in having relationships with a variety of suitable adults: 
it helps them to see alternative ways of being an adult, and alternative ways 
of dealing with the world, giving them resources to reflect on who they 
really are, what they really value, and how to conduct themselves. Parents 
have a duty to facilitate and encourage those relationships (see Gheaus 2011).
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4. ACCOMODATING PLURALISM
Ferracioli proposes two desiderata for a justification of the family: it 
should account for the value of the family over the life-course (2016: 201-
212); and it should be pluralistic, in that it should be able to justify the family 
in “non-liberal cultural contexts” (2016: 212-214). Our theory, she says, 
satisfies neither. It fails on the first because it focuses on relationship goods 
produced by the interactions between parent and child during the latter’s 
childhood; those goods are, for the most part, no longer produced once the 
child has become an independent adult. It fails on the second because of its 
emphasis on parents’ obligation to facilitate their child’s autonomy; parents 
in some non-liberal cultural contexts are indifferent or hostile to the 
development of autonomy but still “manage to enjoy a great degree of 
intimacy, love and affection with their children, and … the lives of all 
parties go much better as a result of partaking in such loving relationships” 
(2016: 213).
Let’s start with pluralism. Ferracioli (2016: 213) claims that we are “too 
quick in assuming that parents are typically capable and willing to ensure 
that their child develop the agential skills needed to make their own life 
choices…” and  “fail to see that the right of children in becoming sufficiently 
autonomous can instead correlate with a duty on the part of the state to 
create a neutral system of compulsory public education” (2016: 213-214). 
But we assume neither that parents will be motivated to facilitate autonomy 
nor that, even if so motivated, they will be able to do so without a cooperative 
environment, such as the right kind of schooling and a reasonably fluid 
and pluralistic culture. When the environment is not supportive – when, 
for example, adequate schooling is unavailable, or, as for some Black families 
in some American cities, access to it puts children in physical danger—parents 
are raising children in non-ideal circumstances. As we have said, we make 
no attempt at the complex task of weighing the different considerations that 
apply to parents in such circumstances. Nevertheless, in liberal societies, 
autonomy is an important achievement, and parents who successfully resist 
the development of their children’s autonomy in a liberal society are 
wronging those children. More, they are losing something valuable for 
themselves—the challenge of raising a child to independence, aiming to 
enable her to separate herself from them, while hoping that, nevertheless, 
they can remain close.
The value of autonomy—and of raising a child to be autonomous—enable 
us to say something about what is wrong with illiberal societies and societies 
that, although not illiberal, permit environments in which parents’ concern 
for their children’s wellbeing rightly inclines them not to facilitate their 
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children’s autonomy. One thing that is wrong is just this: that they make it 
harder, or dangerous, for children to become autonomous, and make it harder, 
or wrong, for parents to experience the good of raising a child to become 
autonomous. It also enables us to say something about what parents do wrong 
when unduly insistent that their child “uncritically endorse what they take to 
be deep truths about the world” (Ferracioli 2016: 213).
Does our theory justify the family in non-liberal cultural contexts? 
Assume that non-liberal contexts are characterized by indifference or 
hostility to autonomy: parents do not aim to make their children autonomous 
and independent, and the social environment does not take up the slack, 
as it were, so autonomy is neither valued as an aim, nor an achieved as an 
outcome. In such contexts the family can still be valuable, and can still be 
justified, and our theory does explain why: parents can still oversee children’s 
development, and both parties can enjoy intimate, close, loving relationships 
and enjoy familial relationship goods. But both parties are also missing 
something of great value—a vital developmental interest of children is 
neglected, and parents miss out on the distinctively rewarding challenge 
of acting as a fiduciary for someone whom one is raising to full independence 
of thought and word and deed. 
Someone who did not value autonomy, or was even hostile to it, could 
accept a great deal of our theory, while rejecting the claims we make about 
the importance of autonomy for children, and the distinctive value of 
fostering autonomy as part of the fiduciary obligation toward children. She 
would offer different content for children’s interests, and hence for the 
adult interest in acting as a child’s fiduciary, but could nevertheless think 
we have said enough that is right both to justify the family, and to vindicate, 
for example, our analysis of legitimate parental partiality. 
5. VALUING CONTINUITY 
Ferracioli’s second desideratum for a successful justif ication of the 
parent-child relationship is that it can explain the continuing value of the 
relationship between parent and child after the child has reached 
adulthood. While we agree that there is great value to such relationships—
and we think our theory explains it—we reject her view if it is understood 
as proposing an adequacy condition on a justification of the family. We 
nevertheless found this objection helpful in clarifying what the project of 
justifying the family is.
The task of justifying the family is different from the task of exposing all 
of the good-making features of the family. Ferracioli’s description of the 
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value of continuing relationships between parent and child beyond the 
latter’s childhood does, indeed, seem to us to be a description of something 
very good in human relationships, that the family (or something very like 
it) makes possible. In justifying the family, though, we are trying to justify 
a distinctive arrangement that, given its unusual character and, in particular, 
its assignment of considerable discretion in the use of coercive power to 
some human beings over others who are asymmetrically dependent and 
vulnerable, appears to call for justification. A principle of parsimony seems 
in order: we should invoke just those good-making features that are needed 
in order to do the justificatory work, and no more. We do think that the 
good of continuing relationships in adulthood adds to the value of the family, 
but invoking it to justify arrangements of this kind is not necessary and, in 
fact, probably does no work, because the relationship it refers to is among 
consenting adults. 
Anticipating this response, Ferracioli (2016: 212) rejects it as follows: 
“One reason why this response is unsatisfactory is that the inability 
of the child to exit a parent-child relationship is not a necessary feature 
of this sort of relationship and that it is possible for there to be intimate 
relationships where the child actually enjoys exit options. These are, 
for instance, relationships where a parent lacks custody rights over 
the child and decides to give the child a lot of space to choose whether 
or not, and to what extent, to partake in the relationship. One might 
think that the enjoyment of exit options on the part of the child dispels 
the need for justification in such cases, but I take it that the degree of 
intimacy involved at all stages of the relationship, and the mere 
possibility that society could be arranged differently, suffice for 
making the parent-child relationship, at its most general level, 
proper subject of philosophical justification. It would therefore be 
unsatisfying if Brighouse and Swift were solely in the business of 
explaining why it is permissible for there to be relationships between 
competent parents and children where the latter have no prospect of 
exiting the relationship”.
We are not sure whether we understand the case properly. If the child 
had exit options from the start of the relationship it seems to us that it just 
isn’t a parent-child relationship. Is the child mature enough that a responsible 
parent is justified in giving her exit options, as opposed to on the one hand 
making the choice for her (because he is in the rare situation of having good 
reasons to believe she will be much better off without him) or, on the other, 
giving her temporary space to spend less time with him?  If so, then it is not 
clear that he is, any longer, a parent to her because, even before she exits, 
he is no longer playing the fiduciary role. In any case, we agree with Ferracioli 
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that something is going wrong in this relationship, and we agree that our 
theory does not explain what is going wrong, but we are not unsatisfied 
with this. 
That said, we think that our justification of the family does help to explain 
the value of the continuation of the parent-child relationship into the child’s 
adulthood. In general, it is good for people to continue intimate relationships 
with others, and it is easy to see why, for the parent, continued intimacy with 
an adult whom he has raised from childhood would be especially good. It 
is similarly easy to see why the loss of that relationship might be devastating. 
For the child, continuing into adulthood a relationship with someone who 
has overseen her development, but from whom she is now independent, is 
distinctively valuable, and in ways that go beyond the disorientation likely 
to result from the ending of the relationship. 
CONCLUDING COMMENT
It is delightful to have one’s work read at all. To have it read carefully, 
thoughtfully, and engaged with by excellent critics is an honor. We’re grateful 
to the editors for prompting the critics and to the critics for giving us such 
rich food for thought.
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